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Frank: Paul v. Davis

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
PAUL v. DAVIS
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-Fourteenth Amendment-Defamation

-Procedural due process guarantees are not required when
public officials seek to characterize a private citizen as a criminal. 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976).
After the Supreme Court's ruling in Wisconsin v.
Constantineaulto the effect that notice and an opportunity to be
heard are required before the government may take any action
adversely affecting an individual's reputation, one would have
thought that the outcome of Paul v. Davis' was a foregone conclusion.3 The Supreme Court in Paul, however, rejected the respondent's contentions that the circulation of a flyer accusing him of
criminal activity resulted in (1) a deprivation of due process as
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment and (2) an invasion of
his right to privacy.' The Court held that injury to one's reputation alone did not justify the invocation of procedural protections
nor did it give rise to the claimed infringement of respondent's
right to privacy.'
In Paul the chiefs of police of the city of Louisville and the
county of Jefferson, Kentucky, distributed approximately 800
copies of a flyer to merchants in the Louisville metropolitan area.'
This flyer contained the names and photographs of persons
1. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
2. 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976).
3. See text accompanying note 15 infra. The sole issue in Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
400 U.S. 433 (1971), was whether the stigmatization of the appellee's good name brought
into operation the procedural safeguards of the due process clause. Note, 49 J. URBAN L.

589, 592 (1971); Note, PriorNotice and HearingBefore Attaching a Badge of Disgrace,25
Sw. L.J. 622, 630 (1971). After holding that due process was required, the Supreme Court
awarded damages to the appellee for the state's failure to provide adequate procedural
protection. Inasmuch as the respondent in Paul had been stigmatized as a criminal without notice and an opportunity to be heard, Wisconsin v. Constantineau,supra, compelled
a judgment in his favor. The Court, however, disagreed. See text accompanying notes 5562 infra.
4. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV provides in part:
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law ....

5. Brief for Respondent passim, Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976).
6. Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1166 (1976).
7. Id. at 1157.
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known to be active shoplifters.' Among those so designated was
the respondent, Davis, who had been arrested in 1971 on a shoplifting charge. The veracity of that "accusation," however, had
never been judicially determined.9 In fact, subsequent to the dissemination of the flyer, the charge was dismissed by a judge of
the Louisville Police Court.'"
At the time the flyer was released, Davis was working as a
photographer for the Louisville Courier-Journaland Times.
Shortly after circulation, the existence of the flyer and the reference to Davis therein were brought to the attention of respondent's supervisor who summoned Davis to appear before him.
After listening to the respondent's account of what had transpired, the supervisor informed him that "'he had best not find
himself in a similar situation' in the future and that he [the
supervisor] 'would view very seriously any further incidents of
this nature.'

",

In consequence of the above sequence of events, Davis sought
damages in addition to declaratory and injunctive relief against
the chiefs of police (petitioners) under 42 U.S.C. § 198312 in
the District Court of the Western District of Kentucky." The
district court granted petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint." The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however,
reversed the lower court's ruling on the basis of Wisconsin v.
8. Id. at 1157-58. The flyer, which consisted of five pages, had the heading "Active
Shoplifter" at the top of each page.
9. id.
10. Id.
11. Brief for Respondent at 3, Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
13. Jurisdiction was based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970), which provides in part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured
by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing
for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States . . ..

14. Paul v. Davis, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1158 (1976).
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Constantineau.5 In reinstating the decision of the district court,
the Supreme Court noted that the "[r]espondent . . . has
pointed to no specific constitutional guarantee
safeguarding the
6

interest he asserts has been invaded."'

In a suit initiated under section 1983, two elements serve as
the essential preconditions to recovery:1 7 (1) the deprivation of a

constitutional right 8 (2) "under color of" law. Although the Court
was fully cognizant of the fact that these were the only two re-

quirements necessary to establish a successful section 1983 claim,
it delved into matters which were wholly irrelevant to the issues

presented.
At the outset the Court became engrossed in speculation as

to the availability of a state remedy 9 for defamatory statements
published by governmental officials. Such an inquiry, however,
is not appropriate in a suit predicated upon section 1983:20
The remedy provided by [the Civil Rights Acts] "is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first
sought and refused before the federal one is invoked."
This notion was first advanced in Screws v. United States2' where
the Supreme Court considered the criminal counterpart of section
1983:22

[T]here is no warrant for treating the question in state law
terms. The problem is not whether state law has been violated
but whether an inhabitant of a State has been deprived of a
federal right by one who acts under "color of any law." . . .
[The federal] statute is applicable when and only when some15. Id.
16. Id. at 1160.
17. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) permits a cause of action for deprivations of rights secured
by both the Constitution and laws; however, the latter type of infringement is irrelevant
to the present case since respondent alleged only the former.
19. [Rlespondent's complaint would appear to state a classical claim for defamation actionable in the courts of virtually every State. Imputing criminal
behavior to an individual is generally considered defamatory perse, and actionable without proof of special damages.
Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1159 (1976).
20. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971) (per curiam), quoting Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1963).
The notion that the federal remedy is supplementary to that provided by the state has
been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court as recently as 1975. Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426,
432-33 (1975); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 609 n.21 (1975).
21. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
22. Id. at 108 (footnote omitted).
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one is deprived of a federal right by that action. The fact that
it is also a violation of state law does not make it any the less a
federal offense punishable as such. Nor does its punishment by
federal authority encroach on state authority or relieve the state
from its responsibility for punishing state offenses.
Even if this iconoclastic approach were a legitimate one, "it
would be incumbent upon the Court to inquire whether respondent has an adequate remedy under Kentucky law or whether
petitioners would be immunized by state doctrines of official or
sovereign immunity."2 3 Such an investigation would have revealed the lack of a remedy under the common law of Kentucky. 4
23. Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1167 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
24. See McAlister & Co. v. Jenkins, 214 Ky. 802, 284 S.W. 88 (1926). This case is of
somewhat antiquated origin; however, extensive research has revealed no other decisions
arising in Kentucky which deal with this question.
While recognizing that the Supreme Court is not the appropriate setting for an initial
determination of the adequacy of a state remedy, suitable investigation by the lower court
on remand would have indicated that a remedy for defamatory remarks made by government officials is virtually nonexistent under the common law of Kentucky:
[An] absolute privilege applies wherever the communication is made in
discharge of a duty under express authority of law by or to heads of executive
departments, provided the libelous communication is pertinent to the inquiry
under investigation at the time.
McAlister & Co. v. Jenkins, 214 Ky. 802, 808, 284 S.W. 88, 91 (1926).
Other jurisdictions are in agreement. See, e.g., Munn v. Burks, 526 P.2d 1040 (Ore.
App. 1974); Rankin v. Philippe, 206 Pa. Super. 27, 211 A.2d 56 (1965), citing Montgomery
v. Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 140 A.2d 100 (1958). For a discussion of absolute privilege
see Green, The Right to Communicate, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 903 (1960); Handler & Klein,
The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits Against Government Executive Officials,
74 HARv. L. REV. 44 (1960).

Of course, McAlister is distinguishable from Paulin that the former involved defamatory statements made by state-appointed real estate commissioners during the course of
a quasi-judicial hearing. The chief of police of a particular jurisdiction, on the other hand,
might not be considered sufficiently high-ranking to be accorded an absolute privilege.
See Barr v. Mateo, 244 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir.), remanded, 355 U.S. 171 (1957); Montgomery
v. Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 186-87, 140 A.2d 100, 105 (1958), citing W. PRossEa, ToaRTS,
§ 109, at 782-84 (2d ed. 1955). In that event, however, he or she would still be entitled to
assert a conditional privilege. See Tucker v. Kilgore, 388 S.W.2d 112, 114-15 (Ky. 1964).
Since both the petitioners and the distributees had a "mutual interest in the subject
matter" of the flyer, a conditional privilege in all likelihood would attach. See Schoonfield
v. Mayor & City Council, 399 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1975); McBride v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 235 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. 1975); Conley v. Southern Import Sales, Inc., 382 F. Supp.
121 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Martinez v. Cardwell, 25 Ariz. App. 253, 542 P.2d 1133 (1975);
White v. State, 17 Cal. App. 3d 621, 95 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1971); Lazar v. Gremillion, 189
So. 2d 35 (La. App. 1966); Hutchinson v. N.E. Tel. & Tel. Co., 350 Mass. 188, 214 N.E.2d
57 (1966). If that were the case, the instructions to the trier of fact would necessitate a
finding of actual malice as a condition of recovery. Tucker v. Kilgore, 388 S.W.2d 112,
114 (Ky. 1964). As a result, the respondent would be left without a remedy under the
common law of the State of Kentucky.
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One fundamental purpose underlying a section 1983 action
which the majority opinion appears to have overlooked is that it
was designed "to provide a federal remedy where the state rem'25
edy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice.
"[The limitations on state remedies for violation of commonlaw rights by private citizens argue in favor of a federal damages
remedy. ' 26 No less can be said where such a violation resulting
in the deprivation of a constitutional right 27 has occurred via the
instrumentalities of the state.
Apart from its failure to acknowledge the consistent denial
of a remedy by state courts in cases involving defamatory statements made by public officials, the Court expressed a second
28
unjustifiable concern over the lack of a "logical stopping place"
should the respondent's view prevail.2 9 To illustrate this concern,
the Court depicted the scene "of an innocent bystander mistakenly shot by a policeman or negligently killed by a sheriff driving
a government vehicle. . ."I and, then, stated that "it would be
difficult to see why the survivors of [the decedent] . . would
31
not have claims equally cognizable under 1983."'
As Mr. Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, the "logical
32
stopping place" lies in the requirement of "under color of' law.
The simple allegation that an official of the state undertook some
action which deprived another of a constitutional right does not
in and of itself transform a state claim into a federal one and,
thereby, give rise to a successful section 1983 action; one must
also assert that the public official was acting pursuant to his or
her authority." There is a distinction between the policeman
who shoots and kills an innocent bystander while in pursuit of a
25. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961).
26. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 409 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
27. If, indeed, one exists in the present case.
28. Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1159 (1976).
29. In effect the Court inferred that the respondent was making the following contention: "[Slince petitioners are respectively an official of city and of county government,
[respondent's] action is thereby transmuted into one for deprivation by the State of
rights secured under the Fourteenth Amendment," although, if the same action had been
taken by a private citizen, he would have a claim only under state law. Id. at 1159.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1168 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33. In accord with this notion is Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) which
states: "Congress in § 20 of the Criminal Code did not undertake to make all torts of state
officials federal crimes. It brought within § 20 only specified acts done 'under color' of law
.... " Id. at 109.
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criminal and an officer who, in his or her private capacity, negligently causes the death of another." It is the "[m]isuse of power,
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because
the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law"3" which
satisfies the "under color of" law requirement of section 1983.
This second prerequisite, as well as the first, serves as a screening
device which prevents section 1983 from becoming equated with
state tort law."
The above claim was made by the respondent in Paul. In
fact, the police chiefs themselves admitted "that their conduct
was intentional and was undertaken in their official capacities"
and, thus, "it is disingenuous for the Court to argue . . . that
respondent is seeking to convert § 1983 into a generalized font of
tort law." 3
This twofold concern over the availability of a state remedy
and the lack of a "logical stopping place" was unfounded. The
sole question for the Court to decide was whether the petitioners'
conduct deprived Davis of a right secured to him by the Constitution.
Whether respondent had in fact been denied procedural due
process necessitates an inquiry into the "nature of the interest at
stake. 38 This determination is crucial to the outcome of Paul
because "[i]t is [only] State action of a particular character
that is prohibited" by the fourteenth amendment and against
which the amendment authorizes Congress to afford relief.35 Due
process is essential where the individual stands to suffer "grievous loss."4" Consequently, the procedural safeguards of notice and
a hearing only become operative where an interest of sufficient
constitutional magnitude is affected.4 1
34. See Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1168 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting):
An official's actions are not "under color of" law merely because he is an official;
an off-duty policeman's discipline of his own children, for example, would not
constitute conduct "under color of" law.
35. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961) (emphasis added). See United States
v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
36. See note 33 supra.
37. Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1168 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority
opinion itself recognized that the "under color of" law requirement was not in issue. Id.
at 1158 n.2.
38. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972).
39. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
40. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
41. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970). See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
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The Court in Paul,however, refused to make this determination. Instead, it asserted that "the variety of interests" encompassed within the fourteenth amendment are those which "have
been initially recognized and protected by state law"4 or by a

specific provision "of the Bill of Rights which has been 'incorpo-

rated' into [that] Amendment."4 3 Although the diversity of interests protected by the fourteenth amendment was at one time
restricted to rights conferred by law," recent pronouncements by

the Supreme Court have indicated that this is no longer true.45
One decision exemplifying this departure from past precedent is Board of Regents v. Roth." There the Court found that a

nontenured state teacher had no "liberty" or "property" interest
which was cognizable under the fourteenth amendment. The

opinion, however, articulated the following rationale with respect
to the due process clause contained therein:47
"Liberty" and "property" are broad and majestic terms.
They are among the "[g]reat [constitutional] concepts ...
[T]hey
purposely left to gather meaning from experience....
relate to the whole domain of social and economic fact, and the
statesmen who founded this Nation knew too well that only a
stagnant society remains unchanged."
The need for liberal interpretation of the term "property" had
motivated the Court's earlier rejection of the right-privilege noU.S. 67, 86-90 (1972) (discussing the "property" interest under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause); 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINisTRATvE LAW § 7.02, at 412 (1958).
Before an interest protected under the fourteenth amendment may be infringed, the
state must provide notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
542 (1971). The state may dispense with these requirements only in "extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the
hearing until after the event." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). See
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
42. Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1165 (1976) (footnote omitted).
43. Id. at 1165 n.5.
44. The majority's statement to this effect is reminiscent of a bygone era when the
right-privilege distinction was still a viable test in the determination of whether a "property" interest under the fourteenth amendment had been implicated. Under this test, if
a private citizen suffered damage to an interest which was not a right per se, his claim
for procedural protections was denied. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
45. For an enumeration of cases rejecting the right-privilege test see Board ofRegents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 n.9 (1971).
46. 408 U.S. 564 (1971).
47. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1971), quoting National Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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tion.48 For similar reasons the content of "liberty" has never been
confined in the way it was by the majority in Paul.49
The belief that the multiplicity of protected liberty and property interests is restricted to either state law or the Bill of Rights
is undoubtedly a "questionable assertion.""0 Instead, the determination of whether an individual is to be accorded due process in
the first instance is dependent upon the gravity of the harm occasioned by the government.51
In Paul three distinct areas of case law serve to clarify the
nature of respondent's asserted claim to his good name and reputation. On the broadest level are those cases dealing with the
state's attachment of "a badge of infamy" to a private citizen."2
Next are those concerned with the infliction of punishment without a prior determination of guilt.5 3 The final sequence of cases
involves a violation of the right of privacy by dissemination of an
individual's prior arrest record. It is the collective force of these
48. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1971).
49. "While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty
. . .guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], the term has received much
consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized. . . as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men." In a Constitution for a free people, there can
be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.
Id. at 572, quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
50. Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1171 n.10 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. Whether any procedural protections are to be given depends upon whether the
individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss." See text accompanying notes 3841 supra. Once it is decided that due process applies, it is necessary to balance the private
interest with the public interest in order to determine what elements of the procedural
guarantee will be required in a particular case. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Factors relevant to this inquiry are as follows:
The precise nature of the interest that has been affected, the manner in which
this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the protection implicit in the office of the functionary
whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt complained of and good accomplished ....
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
52. E.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); Jenkins v.
McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
53. See, e.g., Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 405 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 241 n.6 (1957); cf. 3A J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 980a, at 835-38 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
54. E.g., Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Menard v. Mitchell, 430
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decisions which compels one to conclude that the respondent in
Paul has suffered "grievous loss."
One of the contentions advanced by the respondent herein
was that the petitioners' conduct constituted a denial of due pro5 and the
cess within the meaning of Wisconsin v. Constantineaul
6
precedents upon which that case relied. In Constantineauthe
Court found a state statute to be constitutionally defective because of its failure to provide for notice and an opportunity to be
heard. Upon the written allegation by designated persons that a
particular individual was engaged in excessive drinking, the statute authorized the "posting" of the latter's name in all retail
liquor establishments located in Hartford, Wisconsin. Sales or
gifts of liquor to those posted were prohibited for a period of one
year.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the serious damage 7
which can result from the stigmatization of an individual's good
name. Nonetheless, in Paul it concluded that the injury to respondent's reputation, without an accompanying assertion of economic impairment, 59 was not sufficient to invoke constitutional
guarantees which would render his claim actionable."0 In finding
justification for the respondent's reliance upon Constantineau,
the majority sought to delimit the holding therein in an effort to
reconcile it with prior case law." This objective was achieved by
F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970), remanded, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971), rev'd in part sub
nom. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
55. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
56. E.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). In a case not cited in Constantineauthe following was observed:
The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified
invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent
system of ordered liberty. The protection of private personalty, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments. But this does not mean that the right is entitled to any
less recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitutional system.
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
57. Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1163 (1976).
58. Id. at 1161.
59. The respondent had been placed in a precarious position vis-a-vis his present
employer. See text accompanying note 11 supra. In addition, his mobility in the job
market had been severely handicapped. See, e.g., Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
60. Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1163 (1976).
61. The Court stated the following: "There is undoubtedly language in
Constantineau,which is sufficiently ambiguous to justify the reliance upon it by the Court
of Appeals . . . ." Id. at 1164. The Court then reinterpreted Constantineau:
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the assertion that Constantineauinvolved the deprivation of a
right previously existing under state law, i.e., "the right to pur62
chase or obtain liquor in common with the rest of the citizenry."
Construing the Court's prior decision in this fashion was inconsistent with the language contained in the case. The majority
in Constantineau had explicity maintained that "[t]he only
issue present . . . is whether the label or characterization given
a person by 'posting' . .. is . .. such a stigma or badge of dis-

grace that procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard." 3 This formulation of the issue by the Court
in Constantineau led to the following resolution of the case: 4
"Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is
at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice
and an opportunity to be heard are essential." The construction
given to the above holding. by the Court in Paulwas not responsive to the issue as it was framed by the Court in Constantineau.
The notion that procedural safeguards must be provided
where the government publicly seeks to brand a private citizen
as a criminal is not a novel one. The Court in Jenkins v.
McKeithen65 had arrived at this same conclusion only two years
prior to its decision in Constantineau.The appellant in Jenkins
attacked the constitutionality of a 1967 Louisiana statute providing for the creation of the Louisiana Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry. He alleged that the purposes of this CommisWe should not read this language as significantly broadening [prior) holdings without in any way adverting to the fact if there is any other possible
interpretation of Constantineau'slanguage. We believe there is.
Id.
62. Id.
63. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971) (emphasis added). It is
significant that the Supreme Court in Constantineauquoted applicable language from the
lower court's holding which is consistent with the proposition set forth in the text:
In "posting" an individual, the particular city official or spouse is doing
more than denying him the ability to purchase alcoholic beverages within the
city limits. In essence, he is giving notice to the public that he has found the
particular individual's behavior to fall within one of the categories enumerated
in the statutes. It would be naive not to recognize that such "posting" or characterization of an individual will expose him to public embarrassment and ridicule, and it is our opinion that procedural due process requires that before one
acting pursuant to State statute cah make such a quasi-judicial determination,
the individual involved must be given notice of the intent to post and an opportunity to present his side of the matter.
Id. at 435-36, quoting Constantineau v. Grager, 302 F. Supp. 861, 864 (E.D. Wis. 1969),
64. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
65. 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
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sion were "to find persons guilty of violating criminal laws with-

out trial or procedural safeguards, and to publicize those findings."66 In due course, the Court found the agency's adjudicative
proceedings 7 to be constitutionally inadequate because of the
accusatory function they performed.68 As a consequence, the
Court concluded that due process must be afforded where "an
actual finding that a specific individual is guilty of a crime"6 is
made.
Although Jenkins mandates recognition of a constitutional
"liberty" or "property" interest in reputation, 7° the Supreme
Court distinguished the factual situation presented there from
the petitioners' conduct in the Paul case. 71 As was previously
noted, the former opinion was concerned with determinations
made by an agency for the purpose of exposing the names of those
it found guilty of wrongdoing. In Paul police officials who were
motivated by similar concerns committed the same "offense,"
but their actions "[fell] far short of the more formalized proceedings of [an agency] .
66. Id. at 424.
67. The Commission did not "adjudicate" in the usual sense of that word. Id. at 427,
citing Martone v. Morgan, 251 La. 993, 207 So. 2d 770, appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 12
(1968).
68. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 427-28 (1969). Challenges similar to the ones
made in Jenkins were lodged against the Civil Rights Commission in Hannah v. Larche,
363 U.S. 420 (1960). A contrary result was reached in Hannah due to the agency's investigatory, as opposed to adjudicative, function:
It [The Civil Rights Commission] does not adjudicate. It does not hold trials
or determine anyone's civil or criminal liability. It does not issue orders. Nor
does it indict, punish, or impose any legal sanctions. It does not make determinations depriving anyone of his life, liberty, or property. In short, the Commission does not and cannot take any affirmative action which will affect an individual's legal rights. The only purpose of its existence is to find facts which may
subsequently be used as the basis for legislative or executive action.
Id. at 441 (emphasis added). The Court in Hannah further reasoned that collateral
consequences "would not affect the legitimacy of the Commission's investigative function." Id. at 443 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). In Jenkins, however, the Court
found that the injury was not collateral on account of the accusatory nature of the agency
involved. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 424 (1969).
69. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 429 (1969).
70. Even Mr. Justice Harlan, who had dissented in Jenkins, agreed that due process
comes into play where the "sole . . .function [of a governmental body], without serving
any other public interest, is to expose and publicize the names of persons it finds guilty
of wrongdoing." Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 438 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
In fact, it appears that the only question which prevented the minority from acquiescing
in the majority opinion in this case was whether the complainant had standing to assert
his claim. Id. at 436 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
71. Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1163 n.4 (1976).
72. Id.
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The difficulty with the rationalization put forth is that section 1983 proscribes actions perpetrated "under color of' law. 3 It
does not discriminate among the myriad types of state-created
procedures whereby a person is deprived of a constitutional right.
Indeed, if the distinction postulated were valid, it would have
compelled a repudiation of the result in Constantineau rather
than the construction given to that case by the Court in Paul.4
This observation logically follows from the factual situation depicted in Constantineau. There, as in Paul, a police official and
not an agency had made the determination which resulted in a
75
violation of due process.

It is difficult to perceive how the actions of the petitioners in
the present case "fell" any "shorter" than those taken by the law
enforcement official in Constantineau. This is especially true in
light of the fact that the injury complained of in Paul was of a
more egregious nature." The only discernible difference between
the two cases is that Constantineauinvolved action taken pursuant to a state statute whereas Paul did not; however, this distinction is not a legitimate one. 7
Because of the enormous amount of reliance placed upon
Constantineau by the respondent, the Court misconstrued the
main thrust of his argument. By holding that "mere defamation"
was not enough to enlist the aid of the procedural protections
afforded by the fourteenth amendment,"1 the majority failed to
grasp the essence of respondent's claim: 7"
[The majority opinion] simply fails to recognize the crucial
difference between the question whether there is a personal interest in one's good name and reputation that is constitutionally
cognizable. . . ,and the totally separate question whetherparticulargovernment action with respect to that interest satisfies
the mandates of due process.
73. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
74. See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra.
75. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
76. See Brief for Respondent at 11-12, Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976).
77. The police had prepared and circulated such lists for a period of fifteen years.
Paul v. Davis, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1169 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is reasonable to
assume that this constituted a custom. Thus, the circulation of these lists was action taken
"under color of" law. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970). Consequently, the lack of a state statute authorizing the conduct would not render Paul distinguishable.
78. Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1163 (1976).
79. Id. at 1173-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Limiting the scope of the investigation to the first inquiry necessarily precluded appropriate examination into the precise nature
of the interest alleged to have been invaded.
Respondent had not contended that every injury to a person's reputation caused by the government resulted in a deprivation of due process. Rather, his argument was predicated upon
the particular way in which the damage had occurred. 8 When
based solely upon the fact of an arrest,8 1 the government's accusation that a private citizen is guilty of criminal activity entails
"grievous loss" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment
because of notions implicit in the criminal justice system.
In recognition of the consequences that may befall an individual who is characterized as a criminal, 2 the accused at trial is
clothed with the presumption of innocence. That presumption
remains in effect and punishment may not be imposed until the
state has secured a conviction in accordance with constitutional
demands." Among those safeguards which are constitutionally
mandated is proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 8 -a requirement which is reflective of the value society places upon
one's good name.8"
Numerous courts have entertained equitable proceedings in
an attempt to provide a means of redress against the state's maintenance of criminal arrest records. In Menard v. Mitchell,7 for
example, the complainant sought an order directing the expungement of both his fingerprints and a notation with respect to his
arrest from FBI criminal identification files. The court's compliance with the request was accompanied by the following state-

ment:

88

80. Brief for Respondent at 7-8, Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976). See also Ortwein
v. Mackey, 511 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1975); Kaprelian v. Texas Woman's Univ., 509 F.2d 133
(5th Cir. 1975).
81. When the flyer was distributed, the only outstanding evidence implicating Davis
as an "active shoplifter" was his arrest. Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1158 (1976).
82. See note 99 infra and accompanying text.
83. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970), in conjunction with United States v.
Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 363 (1950).
84. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Menard v. Mitchell,
430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970), remanded, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971), rev'd in part
sub nom. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
87. 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970), remanded, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971), rev'd
in part sub nom. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
88. Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 724 (D.D.C. 1971).
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An arrest whether made with or without probable cause is to be
sure a fact, but one that proves nothing so far as the actual
conduct of the person arrested is concerned . . . Under our
system of criminal justice only a conviction carries legal significance as to a person's involvement in criminal behavior.
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has recognized the minimal
amount of "probative value [an arrest possesses] in showing that
[an individual] has engaged in any misconduct." 9 Such a conclusion is all the more compelling where, as in Paul, no initial
determination of probable cause had been made.
Since the only evidence demonstrating respondent's guilt of
a shoplifting charge has little if any probative value, logic dictates
that the state did not meet its burden of proof in seeking to brand
him as a criminal. The failure to comply with the applicable
standard of proof leaves the respondent with his presumption of
innocence intact. This presumption was destroyed when the police chiefs circulated the flyer.
It has been noted that the punishment of an innocent person
"violates the most rudimentary concept of due process." 9' The
question of whether the actions of the petitioners in Paulresulted
in "punishment" because of the infliction of "grievous loss" can
be answered by resort to cases dealing with the right of privacy.
Decisions in this area have documented the economic and other
injures, which may result from the use of arrest records. 2 Moreover, they implicate still another interest one may possess in
keeping his or her reputation free from taint.
In a final attempt to impress upon the Court the gravity of
the interest at stake, the respondent alleged a violation of his
right to privacy "arising out of the use and abuse of arrest records
... " The majority opinion noted the absence of a specific
constitutional provision securing this right, but it did observe
89. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
An arrest shows nothing more than that someone probably suspected the
person apprehended of an offense. When formal charges are not filed against the
arrested person and he is released without trial, whatever probative force the
arrest may have had is normally dissipated.
Id. at 241 (footnote omitted). The respondent, therefore, asserted that the "sole rationale"
for the inclusion of his name in the flyer was his status as an arrestee, and this constituted
a cruel and unusual punishment. Brief for Respondent at 8, Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155
(1976). See note 116 infra.
90. Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1169 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 405 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
92. See note 99 infra.
93. Brief for Respondent at 15, Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976).
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that "zones of privacy" may be protected by the Constitution. "4
With few exceptions these zones have gained recognition through
5
the more explicit guarantees therein.1
Although the Supreme Court had not directly confronted the
issue until Paul, numerous lower court decisions have indicated
that the maintenance or circulation of arrest records by public
officials where no conviction has been obtained amounts to an
invasion of one's personal right to privacy. 6 The usual remedies
sought in cases of this nature have been orders barring the dissemination of the records and directing their removal from appropriate files. While noting that the availability of the latter type
of relief is somewhat limited,98 the courts have appreciated the
serious consequences attaching to the stigmatization of an individual by publication of his or her arrest record.9
94. Paul v. Davis, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1166 (1976).
95. The right to privacy is based upon notions of liberty found in both the common
law, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) and the Constitution of
the United States, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (ninth and fourteenth
amendments); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (first amendment); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (penumbras of the Bill of Rights and ninth
amendment); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-89 (1928) (fourth and fifth
amendments); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (fourteenth amendment).
Justice Brandeis has described the nature of this right in the following manner:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature,
of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain,
pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The Court in more recent times has found that the specific guarantees of the Constitution necessarily imply the existence of other rights: "[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance . . . .Various guarantees create zones of privacy." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (citations omitted).
96. See, e.g., Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Menard v. Mitchell,
430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970), remanded, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971), rev'd in part
sub noma.Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich.
1971).
97. See note 96 supra.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925, 927 (10th Cir. 1975); Sullivan v.
Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Bilick v. Dudley, 356 F. Supp. 945, 951-52
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
99. E.g., Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("Opportunities
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It was this diversity of adverse effects which could result
from such dissemination that prompted these courts to find an
infringement of the right to privacy. The constitutional basis for
this holding was enunciated in Tarlton v. Saxbe,'0 where the
court observed:' 0 1
Dissemination of inaccurate criminal information without the
precaution of reasonable efforts to forestall inaccuracy restricts
the subject's liberty without any proceduralsafeguardsdesigned
to prevent such inaccuracies. . . .To permit the FBI to dissem-

inate inaccurate criminal information without the FBI making
reasonable efforts to prevent inaccuracy would be tantamount
to permission to accuse individuals of criminal conduct without
ever providing such individuals an opportunity to disprove that
accusation.

The Supreme Court itself has recognized the fourteenth amendment as a basis for the right to privacy in other contexts.'"'
If there is a constitutional foundation for respondent's asserted interest in his privacy,0 3 it would be incumbent upon the
state to demonstrate a legitimate interest which would justify an
intrusion upon it.'° Of course, when an arrest has been made,
for schooling, employment, or professional licenses may be restricted or nonexistent");
Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (noting the result of a study
which clearly indicated the use of arrest records in selecting applicants for employment);
Russell v. United States, 402 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (record of arrest considered in
permitting release pending appeal); United States v. Cifarelli, 401 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 987 (1968) (record of arrest may be used in imposing sentence); Davidson
v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 127, 503 P.2d 157, 159 (1972) ("it is common knowledge that a man
with an arrest record is much more apt to be subject to police scrutiny-the first to be
questioned and the last eliminated as a suspect to an investigation").
100. 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
101. Id. at 1123 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
102. This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amend.
ment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel
it is, or, as the District Court determined. . . is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (emphasis added).
103. It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Rehnquist has concurred in the outcome
of Menard. Rehnquist, Is An Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent With Fairand Effective Law Enforcement?, Nelson Timothy Stephens Lectures, University of Kansas Law
School, at 19 (1974). See Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge
of a New Technology In An Information-OrientedSociety, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1091 (1969):
With greater frequency, however, lawyers and social scientists are expressing the
view that the basic attribute of an effective right to privacy is the individual's
ability to control the flow of information concerning or describing him . ...
Id. at 1107 (footnote omitted).
104. Various courts have required the state to show a "compelling public necessity."
E.g., Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 726 (D.D.C. 1971).
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there is no "constitutional right of privacy that outweighs the
necessity of protecting society and the accumulation of this data
. . ,"I05 When the accused is released without a judicial determination of his guilt, the purported state interest dissipates.)0 6
Consequently, the state has infringed respondent's right to privacy.
The Court in Paul, however, was unwilling to extend the
scope of the right of privacy. Instead, it noted that cases interpreting this right "deal generally with substantive aspects of the
Fourteenth Amendment." ' 7 In addition, the opinion viewed Roe
v. Wade"°8 as authority for the proposition that "the personal
rights found in this guarantee of personal privacy must be limited
to those which are 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty' as described in Palko v. Connecticut . ... "I"
Even if these assertions are correct and the expansive reading
of the right to privacy for which respondent had contended is
impermissible, the Court had not denied the "serious damage"
that the characterization of an individual as a criminal could
entail."' At a minimum the lower court opinions clearly indicate
that the loss occasioned by this particular type of governmental
action is a grievous one."' As a result, the procedural safeguards of the fourteenth amendment come into play,112 and a
denial of these protections gives rise to an actionable section 1983
claim.
CONCLUSION

While recognizing that the alleged infringement of respondent's right to privacy was founded upon the procedural aspects
of the fourteenth amendment,113 the majority in Paul held that
this right does not protect against the state's publication of "a
record of an official act such as an arrest.""' It failed, however,
to perceive that this same state action formed the basis of respondent's separate procedural due process claim. With respect to this
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
supra.
112.
113.
114.

United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D. Puerto Rico 1967).
Id.
Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1166 (1976).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1166 (1976).
See text accompanying notes 57 & 58 supra.
Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 127, 503 P.2d 157, 159-60 (1972). See note 99
See text accompanying note 40 supra.
Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1166 (1976).
Id.
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asserted deprivation, it found that reputation does not implicate
a "liberty" or "property" interest of the fourteenth amendment.
Reputation, as such, was never at stake in the instant case.
The crux of the present controversy lay in the particular way in
which respondent's reputation had been blemished. A close examination of the injury incurred as a result of governmental publication of the fact of an arrest compels the conclusion that due
process guarantees must be provided. The Court, however,
achieved a contrary result by looking at the "reputational" interest in a vacuum. The majority chose to analyze the respondent's
interest in this fashion because it was concerned with the possibility that the state would be liable in a section 1983 action "wherever [it] may be characterized as the tortfeasor.""
On the contrary, section 1983 itself imposes limits upon the
types of torts for which the state may be held responsible. Even
if the action is taken "under color of" law, one must still show
the grievous nature of the purported loss in alleging a denial of
procedural due process. Because of its detrimental impact, the
dissemination by public officials of the fact that respondent was
arrested should result in liability of the state under section
1983.111 Viewed from this perspective, then, Paul v. Davis "must
surely be a short-lived aberration.""' 7
Michael B. Frank
115. Id. at 1160.
116. The punishment of an individual solely on the basis of his status violates the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58,
62 (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated, 401 U.S. 987 (1971) (remanded for reconsideration in light

of Younger v. Harris). Statutes imposing punishment on account of one's status have been
found to be unconstitutional. E.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
117. Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1177 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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